EMVCo and PCI PTS: payment device certification
Guide, payment devices
A device that reads a bank card and processes a payment sits at the intersection of two distinct certification worlds. EMVCo governs the functional correctness of the chip and contactless transaction, through its Level 1 (interface) and Level 2 (kernel) type approvals. The PCI Security Standards Council governs the security of the device that captures the PIN and the cardholder data, principally through PCI PTS POI for terminals and the newer software-based schemes SPoC, CPoC and MPoC for commercial off-the-shelf hardware. On top of both sit the scheme approvals of Visa, Mastercard and the other networks, plus the acquirer onboarding rules. This guide maps which approval a card-reading product needs, in what order, and how the pieces fit together.
The certification landscape for payment devices
Section titled “The certification landscape for payment devices”Three layers of approval combine before a payment terminal can be deployed in the field. They are independent in their criteria but sequential in practice, because each layer assumes the one below it.
| Layer | Owner | Question it answers | Typical artefact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Functional EMV | EMVCo | Does the device correctly read and transact with EMV chip and contactless cards? | EMVCo Letter of Approval (Level 1 and Level 2) |
| Device security | PCI Security Standards Council | Is the PIN and account data protected against tampering and extraction? | PCI PTS POI approval (or SPoC, CPoC, MPoC for COTS) |
| Scheme and acquirer | Visa, Mastercard, others, and the acquiring bank | May this specific device run on our network and be boarded by this acquirer? | Scheme type approval and acquirer registration |
EMVCo and PCI are global, brand-neutral bodies. EMVCo is collectively owned by the major payment networks and maintains the EMV specifications. The PCI Security Standards Council maintains the security standards for the payment ecosystem. The schemes then build their commercial type approval programmes on top of these neutral foundations, which is why the EMVCo and PCI approvals normally have to exist before a scheme will grant its own approval.
ISO/IEC 7816 ISO/IEC 14443Who needs what
Section titled “Who needs what”The decision starts with two questions: does the product read cards, and does it accept a PIN or handle cardholder data.
- A device that reads EMV cards (contact, contactless, or both) needs EMVCo Level 1, and Level 2 for each card kernel it runs.
- A device that accepts a PIN or otherwise captures sensitive cardholder data at the point of interaction needs a PCI PTS approval (POI, EPP, or a COTS scheme).
- A device intended to operate on a given network needs the corresponding scheme type approval and must be accepted by the acquirer.
A simple contactless-only acceptance app running on a phone follows a very different path (CPoC or MPoC) from a fully attended countertop terminal with a physical PIN pad (Level 1, Level 2 and PTS POI).
EMVCo: functional type approval
Section titled “EMVCo: functional type approval”EMVCo type approval demonstrates that a device behaves correctly against the EMV specifications. It is split into two levels that test different parts of the stack.
Level 1: the interface
Section titled “Level 1: the interface”EMVCo Level 1 covers the electrical, electromechanical and protocol layer between the device and the card. For contact cards it verifies compliance with the EMV contact specifications layered on ISO/IEC 7816 (physical contacts, power, clock, transmission protocols T=0 and T=1). For contactless it verifies the analogue and digital radio interface layered on ISO/IEC 14443 (the EMV Contactless Communication Protocol, formerly the analogue and digital books). Level 1 testing uses calibrated reference equipment and a defined test bench, and it is agnostic to the payment application.
ISO/IEC 7816 ISO/IEC 14443Level 2: the kernel
Section titled “Level 2: the kernel”EMVCo Level 2 covers the application kernel, the software that runs the transaction logic on top of a Level 1 compliant interface. For contact, this is the EMV Integrated Circuit Card Specifications kernel. For contactless, EMVCo defines a family of kernels (historically numbered, for example the kernels associated with the major card brands) within the EMV Contactless Specifications for Payment Systems, often referred to as Book C. A device that runs several contactless kernels must obtain a Level 2 approval for each.
Level 3 and acquirer testing
Section titled “Level 3 and acquirer testing”EMVCo itself approves Levels 1 and 2. End-to-end testing of the combined terminal and acquirer host, sometimes labelled Level 3, is not an EMVCo approval but an integration and acceptance activity run by the acquirer or a scheme test service, validating that the configured terminal transacts correctly against the live host.
| EMVCo step | What is tested | Approving body | Output |
|---|---|---|---|
| Level 1 contact | Electrical and protocol interface, ISO/IEC 7816 based | EMVCo via accredited lab | Letter of Approval |
| Level 1 contactless | Analogue and digital RF interface, ISO/IEC 14443 based | EMVCo via accredited lab | Letter of Approval |
| Level 2 | Application kernel transaction logic, per kernel | EMVCo via accredited lab | Letter of Approval |
| Level 3 (acquirer) | End-to-end terminal plus host configuration | Acquirer or scheme test service | Acceptance, not an EMVCo LoA |
PCI PTS POI: device security
Section titled “PCI PTS POI: device security”While EMVCo asks whether the device transacts correctly, PCI PTS POI (PIN Transaction Security, Point of Interaction) asks whether it protects the secrets it handles. The standard is published by the PCI Security Standards Council as the PTS POI Modular Security Requirements, and an approved device is listed on the council website with an expiry date tied to the standard version it was approved against.
The modules
Section titled “The modules”PTS POI is modular. A device is evaluated against the modules relevant to its design:
- Core physical security: resistance to physical tamper, penetration and bench attacks, with active tamper response that zeroises keys.
- Core logical security: firmware authenticity, secure boot, access control, protection of the PIN entry path.
- Online and offline PIN: the secure handling and encryption of the PIN.
- SRED (Secure Reading and Exchange of Data): account data encryption at the point of capture, an optional but widely required module.
- Open protocols: hardening of any IP or network stack exposed by the device.
- Integration: rules for combining the device into a larger system.
Approval classes within PTS
Section titled “Approval classes within PTS”The PTS programme covers several device shapes through distinct approval classes.
| PTS class | Device type | Typical deployment |
|---|---|---|
| POI | Complete payment terminal | Attended countertop, mobile (mPOS), unattended |
| EPP (Encrypting PIN Pad) | PIN pad module only | ATM, fuel dispenser, vending and kiosk integration |
| SCR (Secure Card Reader) | Secure reader that encrypts card data | Component readers; the SCRP variant adds secure PIN for SPoC |
| HSM | Hardware Security Module | Back-end key management and transaction processing |
The HSM standard sits within the PCI PTS family and applies to the back-end devices, not the customer-facing terminal. The terminal-facing classes are POI, EPP and SCR.
Secure cryptographic device and key management
Section titled “Secure cryptographic device and key management”PCI PTS treats the terminal as a secure cryptographic device in the sense of ISO 13491, the financial services standard for retail secure cryptographic devices. Key management must follow disciplined principles: unique keys per device where required, no clear-text keys outside the secure boundary, dual control and split knowledge for manual key loading, and increasingly the use of remote key loading and methods such as DUKPT (Derived Unique Key Per Transaction) for transaction key derivation. Tamper response, secure key storage and a controlled device life cycle from manufacture to decommissioning are central to the evaluation.
ISO 13491Software-based acceptance: SPoC, CPoC and MPoC
Section titled “Software-based acceptance: SPoC, CPoC and MPoC”The classic model assumes purpose-built secure hardware. The PCI council also publishes standards that let a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) device such as a smartphone or tablet take payments, shifting part of the security burden to software and to a back-end monitoring system.
| Standard | Full name | PIN entry | Card capture | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SPoC | Software-based PIN Entry on COTS | Yes, on the COTS touchscreen | Via a separate SCRP secure reader | PIN protected by software plus a monitored back end |
| CPoC | Contactless Payments on COTS | No | Built-in NFC of the COTS device | Tap only, no PIN on glass |
| MPoC | Mobile Payments on COTS | Optional (PIN on glass) | Built-in NFC or attached reader | Modular standard that consolidates SPoC and CPoC |
SPoC pairs a PCI-approved SCRP (Secure Card Reader for PIN) with a PIN entry application on the COTS device, backed by a back-end monitoring and attestation system that watches the COTS fleet for tampering and revokes compromised instances. CPoC allows contactless acceptance using the phone built-in NFC, without a PIN. MPoC, the more recent standard, merges and generalises both into a modular framework that can support PIN on the screen and contactless together, and it introduces an ongoing monitoring and security requirement rather than a single point-in-time test. For new COTS acceptance products, MPoC is the strategic target.
Scheme and acquirer approvals
Section titled “Scheme and acquirer approvals”EMVCo and PCI approvals are necessary but not sufficient. Each payment network maintains its own type approval programme that consumes the EMVCo Letters of Approval and the PCI listing and adds brand-specific requirements.
- Visa maintains an approved devices and terminal programme; a device must appear on the relevant Visa list to run Visa transactions.
- Mastercard runs its Terminal Quality Management and related approval processes.
- Other networks (for example domestic schemes) maintain comparable programmes.
The acquiring bank then performs onboarding (boarding) of the specific device and configuration, which is where end-to-end (Level 3) testing happens. A device cannot be deployed simply because it holds EMVCo and PCI approvals; it must also be accepted by the schemes whose cards it will process and registered by the acquirer that settles its transactions.
How the approvals chain together
Section titled “How the approvals chain together”The dependencies run bottom-up. A break at any layer blocks the layer above.
- Confirm the EMVCo Level 1 interface approval for contact and contactless as applicable.
- Obtain EMVCo Level 2 approval for each kernel the device runs.
- Complete the PCI PTS POI evaluation (or the COTS-route standard) and get listed.
- Apply for scheme type approval with each network, citing the EMVCo LoAs and the PCI listing.
- Complete acquirer onboarding and end-to-end (Level 3) acceptance with the host.
Step by step: planning a payment device certification
Section titled “Step by step: planning a payment device certification”A structured plan reduces the risk of expensive late surprises in a payment device programme.
- Define the device class. Decide whether the product is an attended terminal, an unattended terminal, an EPP module, a secure component reader, or a COTS-based acceptance app. This selects the applicable PCI class and the SPoC, CPoC or MPoC route.
- List the EMV interfaces. Determine whether the device supports contact, contactless, or both, and enumerate the contactless kernels it will run. Each interface and kernel maps to an EMVCo Level 1 or Level 2 approval.
- Choose the laboratories. Select EMVCo-accredited and PCI-recognised laboratories early, and reserve slots, because queues drive the timeline more than the testing itself.
- Freeze the security architecture. Settle the tamper-responsive boundary, the secure boot chain, the key management scheme (including remote key loading and DUKPT) and the SRED account-data encryption before evaluation.
- Run EMVCo and PCI in parallel. The functional and security tracks are independent and can proceed together once hardware and firmware are stable.
- Target the schemes and acquirer. Identify the networks and the acquiring bank early, since their specific requirements may feed back into the hardware design.
- Plan maintenance. PCI approvals expire with the standard version and need renewal; firmware changes can require delta evaluations. MPoC adds continuous monitoring obligations.
Common pitfalls
Section titled “Common pitfalls”| Pitfall | Manifestation | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Treating EMVCo and PCI as one approval | Programme assumes a single test campaign, then discovers two independent tracks | Plan EMVCo (functional) and PCI (security) as separate, parallel work streams |
| Forgetting a contactless kernel | Device runs several brand kernels but only one Level 2 approval was obtained | Enumerate every kernel at design time and budget a Level 2 per kernel |
| Late security architecture | Tamper boundary or key management reworked after PTS evaluation starts | Freeze the secure cryptographic device design before booking the PTS lab |
| Ignoring approval expiry | A device drops off the approved list when its PTS standard version sunsets | Track the expiry date tied to the PTS version and plan re-evaluation |
| Underestimating scheme approval | Team plans only for EMVCo and PCI, not for Visa and Mastercard type approval | Add scheme type approval and acquirer onboarding to the schedule |
| Wrong COTS route | A PIN-on-glass product is scoped as CPoC, which forbids PIN entry | Map PIN entry need to SPoC or MPoC, reserve CPoC for tap-only acceptance |
| Skipping end-to-end testing | Certified components fail in production against the live host | Budget Level 3 acquirer acceptance after EMVCo and PCI approvals |
Further reading
Section titled “Further reading”- Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408): IT security evaluation
- FIPS 140-3: cryptographic module validation
- NFC Forum device certification
- Risk management: ISO 14971, IEC 31010, FMEA and FTA
- Certification getting started
- spilma glossary
Sources and references
Section titled “Sources and references”Sources & references
- EMVCo, EMV Contact and Contactless specifications and the Type Approval process , EMVCo www.emvco.com/
- PCI Security Standards Council, PTS POI Modular Security Requirements and approved devices list , PCI Security Standards Council www.pcisecuritystandards.org/
- PCI Software-based PIN Entry on COTS (SPoC) Standard and Programme Guide , PCI Security Standards Council www.pcisecuritystandards.org/document_library/
- PCI Mobile Payments on COTS (MPoC) Standard , PCI Security Standards Council www.pcisecuritystandards.org/standards/mobile-payments-on-cots/
- ISO/IEC 7816, Identification cards, integrated circuit cards with contacts , ISO/IEC www.iso.org/standard/54089.html
- ISO/IEC 14443, Cards and security devices, proximity contactless objects , ISO/IEC www.iso.org/standard/73599.html
- ISO 13491, Financial services, secure cryptographic devices (retail) , ISO www.iso.org/standard/79518.html
- Visa Approved Devices and Mastercard Terminal Quality Management programme references , Visa www.visa.com/