SESIP and EN 17927: IoT platform security evaluation
SESIP (Security Evaluation Standard for IoT Platforms) is the security evaluation methodology GlobalPlatform publishes under reference GP_FST_070: version 1.0 in March 2020, 1.1 in July 2021, 1.2 in July 2023. Version 1.2 was adopted by CEN and CENELEC as EN 17927 and has been mandatory for evaluations submitted after 1 July 2024. SESIP borrows the Common Criteria formalism but replaces its functional catalogue and EAL packages with five levels of its own, and it is built for composition: a chip, a secure OS and a crypto library can be certified separately and reused in a platform. This guide follows the GlobalPlatform texts level by level, corrects the PSA Certified mapping that circulates widely, and places SESIP against EN 18031, EUCC and the Cyber Resilience Act, where it does not give a presumption of conformity.
What SESIP is, in its own words
Section titled “What SESIP is, in its own words”The methodology describes itself as a variant of the Common Criteria framework (ISO/IEC 15408, version 3.1) specialised for "Connected Platforms", with three explicit departures in the v1.0 text:
- Functional requirements: SESIP does not use the Common Criteria Part 2 catalogue. It has its own catalogue of security functional requirements (SFR), each covering a full security purpose (for example "Verification of Platform Identity", "Secure Update of Platform") rather than a low-level mechanism.
- Assurance requirements: SESIP uses the Common Criteria Part 3 assurance components, with refinements and additions, but not the EAL packages. It defines its own packages, SESIP1 to SESIP5.
- Scheme: the methodology does not itself organise certification or mutual recognition. That is done by the SESIP Governance document, which licenses certification bodies (ISO/IEC 17065) and laboratories (ISO/IEC 17025).
Two functional requirements are compulsory in every Security Target: "Verification of Platform Identity", and either "Secure Update of Platform" or a justification under ALC_FLR.2 of why updates do not apply. The minimum threat model is an attacker with remote access only during exploitation, although that attacker may have studied a purchased sample physically beforehand. Physical access during exploitation is an extended scenario, covered by adding the requirements "Limited Physical Attacker Resistance" or "Physical Attacker Resistance".
Other catalogue entries are optional and chosen per product. "Secure Initialization of Platform" is the SESIP form of secure boot: the platform checks its authenticity and integrity at start-up and otherwise goes to a controlled state. "Attestation of Platform Genuineness" is an attestation of the platform identity that cannot be cloned or changed without detection. The v1.0 text notes that Common Criteria Part 2 has no direct equivalent for either.
Versions and dates
Section titled “Versions and dates”| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| March 2020 | SESIP v1.0 (GP_FST_070), public release | GlobalPlatform specification library |
| July 2021 | SESIP v1.1: more composition guidance, a new annex, SESIP Profiles and SESIP mappings introduced | GlobalPlatform specification library |
| July 2022 | SESIP Governance v1.0, first public release | Governance v1.3, revision history |
| 24 November 2022 | SESIP Profile for PSA Certified Level 3, v1.0 REL 02 (claim: SESIP 3) | PSA Certified |
| July 2023 | SESIP v1.2: new functional requirements, some aligned with the CEN/CENELEC work item | GlobalPlatform specification library |
| November 2023 | SESIP v1.2 adopted by CEN and CENELEC as EN 17927 | SESIP Bulletin No. 1 |
| 1 February 2024 | v1.2 may be used for evaluations | SESIP Bulletin No. 1 |
| March 2024 | SESIP to RED-hEN mapping (GPS_NOT_021), against the draft prEN 18031 | GlobalPlatform |
| 1 July 2024 | v1.2 mandatory for all evaluations submitted after this date | SESIP Bulletin No. 1 |
| September 2024 | Governance v1.2: certificate QR code, upgrade path from SESIP2 to SESIP3 laboratory requirements | Governance v1.3, revision history |
| September 2025 | Arm donates the PSA Certified scheme to GlobalPlatform | GlobalPlatform |
| November 2025 | SESIP Profile for PSA Certified Level 2 v1.0 (GPS_SPE_112, claim: SESIP 2) | GlobalPlatform / PSA Certified |
| September 2026 | Governance v1.3 (GP_PRO_067): SESIP Recognition Board, refined certification body requirements, updated SESIP4 and SESIP5 laboratory skills | GlobalPlatform |
The European standard is EN 17927:2023, "Security Evaluation Standard for IoT Platforms (SESIP). An effective methodology for applying cybersecurity assessment and re-use for connected products", owned by CEN/CLC/JTC 13. National adoptions carry their own dates, for example DIN EN 17927:2024-03 in Germany, which is why "EN 17927:2024" appears in some catalogues. The Governance document accepts either GP_FST_070 or EN 17927 as the accreditation scope for SESIP1 to SESIP3 certification bodies.
The five levels, as the methodology defines them
Section titled “The five levels, as the methodology defines them”The table follows the SESIP v1.0 text for the evaluator activity and the developer evidence. The attack potential and rating ranges come from the informative mapping in the GlobalPlatform SESIP Profile for secure microcontrollers and microprocessors (MCU/MPU, 2024 public review), which uses the smart card attack potential rating.
| Level | AVA_VAN component | Attack potential (rating) | What the evaluator does | What the developer supplies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SESIP1 | AVA_VAN.1 | Basic (16 to 20) | Checks the Security Target and its self-assessment rationale for clarity and consistency. No independent check that the platform implements the functional requirements | Simplified Security Target, self-assessment rationale, public flaw reporting procedure, self-check against public vulnerabilities |
| SESIP2 | AVA_VAN.2 | Basic (16 to 20) | Time-limited black-box penetration testing and independent conformance testing | Same, plus a complete functional specification (ADV_FSP.4) and proof of functional testing. No source code |
| SESIP3 | AVA_VAN.3 | Enhanced-basic (21 to 24) | Time-limited source code analysis combined with penetration testing (white box) | Same, plus the full source code mapped to the functional requirements (ADV_IMP.3) and version management evidence |
| SESIP4 | AVA_VAN.4 | Moderate (25 to 30) | In v1.0, only as a complement to an existing Common Criteria certification (then SOG-IS) that includes AVA_VAN.4: the evaluator checks the translation of the CC Security Target into a SESIP one | The CC certificate and Security Target, plus the SESIP rationale |
| SESIP5 | AVA_VAN.5 | High (31 and above) | Same principle as SESIP4, with AVA_VAN.5 | Same as SESIP4 |
Three consequences follow directly from the text:
- SESIP2 is already a penetration test, not a documentation review. It is "the highest level that can be applied to a closed-source platform without cooperation by the developer".
- SESIP3 is the source code level. Without source code, a vendor cannot go beyond SESIP2.
- SESIP4 and SESIP5 are import levels. The 2024 MCU/MPU profile still labels them "import of CC EAL4+". The Governance v1.3 accordingly requires certification bodies licensed for SESIP4 and SESIP5 to hold either an EUCC accreditation in the technical domains smart cards and similar devices and/or hardware devices with security boxes, or an ISO/IEC 17065 accreditation with SESIP scope.
Version 1.0 also forbids augmentation: a developer cannot claim one higher assurance component on top of a SESIP level. Only a certification scheme may add or raise a requirement, and then for all its certifications.
What laboratories must master, per level
Section titled “What laboratories must master, per level”Governance v1.3 sets the skills a laboratory needs for each level (each level also requires the skills of the level below):
| Level | Accreditation | Software skills | Hardware skills (when hardware is in scope) |
|---|---|---|---|
| SESIP1 | ISO/IEC 17025 | Software security assessment, knowledge of state-of-the-art remote attacks | Knowledge of hardware attacks (public vulnerabilities) |
| SESIP2 | ISO/IEC 17025 | Basic software analysis, simple (random) fuzzing, reverse engineering and static/dynamic analysis tools | Standard fault injection (EMFI, glitch), standard side-channel, board-level testing (chip probing, memory dumping) |
| SESIP3 | ISO/IEC 17025 | Advanced software analysis (complex memory corruption, race conditions, design errors), model-based fuzzing | Specialised fault injection (LFI, BBI), specialised side-channel, chip preparation for invasive attacks |
| SESIP4 | ISO/IEC 17025, plus active participation in Common Criteria working groups | Advanced software analysis and vulnerability research | Advanced and combined fault injection and side-channel, invasive and non-invasive attack scenarios, chip-level exploitation |
| SESIP5 | ISO/IEC 17025, plus active participation in Common Criteria working groups | Novel attack techniques, research-level capabilities | Novel fault injection and side-channel techniques, chip-level manipulation beyond standard methodologies |
This is why the common shortcut "side-channel starts at SESIP4" is wrong: fault injection and side-channel skills are required from SESIP2 for a laboratory that evaluates hardware, and the platform claim on physical attacks is made through the physical resistance requirements.
Profiles, Security Targets and composition
Section titled “Profiles, Security Targets and composition”A SESIP Profile fixes the minimum functional requirements, the assurance level and the threat mapping for a product type. There is no single universal profile: GlobalPlatform publishes several (for example the profile for secure microcontrollers and microprocessors, which claims SESIP2, and the PSA Certified profiles), and an evaluation may also be "ST based", with no profile. The certificate states which profile and packages apply.
The Security Target uses the SESIP assurance classes: ST introduction, security objectives for the operational environment, the listed functional requirements and the TOE summary specification (ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.1, ASE_REQ.3, ASE_TSS.1 at every level).
Composition rules
Section titled “Composition rules”The v1.0 composition rules are short and strict:
- Each evaluated part must produce composition guidelines, written as objectives for the environment and referenced in its guidance.
- The evaluation of a composition checks that the guidance of every part is respected and assesses the impact of the composition on each part.
- By default, a composition claims at most the lowest level of its parts. A platform made of a SESIP2 part and a SESIP5 part is SESIP2 overall.
- The Security Target may instead single out the functional requirements covered by the higher-level part. The claim then reads "SESIP2 with SESIP5 part(s)", a format the Governance document carries onto the certificate.
The certificate itself must show the level and attacker profile, the Security Target and profile references, the certification type (composition, standalone or dependent) and the certificates it relies on, including certificates from other schemes.
| Certificate field (Governance v1.3, Annex A) | What it tells an integrator |
|---|---|
| SESIP level, for example "SESIP2" or "SESIP2 with SESIP5 part(s)" | Whether the high level covers the whole TOE or only some functional requirements |
| Attacker profiles | Whether physical attackers were in scope |
| SESIP Profile reference and packages, or "ST based" | Which minimum SFR set was claimed |
| Certification type: composition, standalone, dependent | Whether the result rests on other certificates |
| Composition certificates or dependency details | Which upstream certificates must stay valid |
| Validity | End date, at most five years after issue |
TOE types listed on certificates include hardware, firmware, standalone or dependent software, hard and soft macros, and standalone or dependent microkernels.
SESIP and PSA Certified
Section titled “SESIP and PSA Certified”PSA Certified uses SESIP for its chip-level evaluations, and since September 2025 the scheme belongs to GlobalPlatform after Arm donated it. The levels, per PSA Certified and the SESIP profiles:
| PSA Certified level | What it demonstrates (PSA Certified) | SESIP claim in the profile | Vulnerability analysis effort stated in the profile |
|---|---|---|---|
| Level 1 | Good security principles applied; questionnaire reviewed by a laboratory | No SESIP claim | Not applicable |
| Level 2 | The PSA Root of Trust protects against scalable software attacks, by independent testing | SESIP 2 (GPS_SPE_112 v1.0, November 2025) | 25 person-days (AVA_VAN.2) for a standard PSA-RoT |
| Level 2 + Secure Element | Level 2 plus physical protection of keys and crypto in a trusted subsystem | Trusted subsystem certified to at least PSA Level 3 RoT Component, SESIP 3 or AVA_VAN.3 | Not stated |
| Level 3 | The PSA-RoT protects against substantial hardware and software attacks | SESIP 3 (v1.0 REL 02, November 2022) | 35 person-days (AVA_VAN.3) for a standard PSA-RoT |
| Level 4 iSE/SE | High robustness of an integrated secure enclave or external secure element | Not covered by the profiles above | Not stated |
The effort figures assume source code is available, no functional requirement is added, nothing is reused and the two cryptographic requirements cover one algorithm. The Level 2 profile also allows two routes: the PSA Level 2 Protection Profile with its own evaluation methodology, or a SESIP evaluation against this profile, under either GP_FST_070 or EN 17927.
Where SESIP sits in EU law
Section titled “Where SESIP sits in EU law”RED and EN 18031
Section titled “RED and EN 18031”The RED cybersecurity requirements (Article 3(3)(d), (e), (f)) apply since 1 August 2025, and Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/138 cites EN 18031-1, -2 and -3, with restrictions. EN 17927 is not among the cited standards. GlobalPlatform published in March 2024 a mapping of SESIP requirements to the then draft prEN 18031, presented as a way to use a platform evaluation "as evidence to support" an EN 18031 demonstration. The evidence still has to fit the EN 18031 assessments of the final radio product.
The EUCC scheme, adopted by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 and applicable since 27 February 2025, evaluates against the Common Criteria and the Common Evaluation Methodology (Article 3). Its levels are "substantial" (AVA_VAN.1 or 2) and "high" (AVA_VAN.3, 4 or 5), and a certificate is valid for at most five years unless the national cybersecurity certification authority approves a longer period (Article 12). The regulation does not mention SESIP. The link runs the other way: SESIP Governance v1.3 accepts an EUCC accreditation as one route for SESIP4 and SESIP5 certification bodies.
Cyber Resilience Act
Section titled “Cyber Resilience Act”The CRA (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) applies reporting obligations from 11 September 2026 and in full from 11 December 2027. Microprocessors and microcontrollers with security-related functionalities are class I important products (Annex III), their tamper-resistant versions class II, and smart cards or similar devices, including secure elements, are critical products (Annex IV). Presumption of conformity comes from:
- harmonised standards cited in the Official Journal (Article 27(1)), with presumption of conformity limited to the requirements they cover;
- common specifications adopted by implementing act (Article 27(2) and (5));
- a certificate under a European cybersecurity certification scheme adopted under Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (Article 27(8)), with the Commission empowered to specify which schemes qualify (Article 27(9)).
SESIP is none of these. Under standardisation request M/606 (C(2025)618), the joint CEN, CENELEC and ETSI work programme of 2 April 2025 assigns the microprocessor and microcontroller lines (28, 29), the tamper-resistant lines (37, 38) and one of the two smart card items (line 41a, the other, 41b, sitting with CEN/TC 224) to CLC/TC 47X, with EN numbers still to be defined. EN 17927 does not appear in that programme. Whether SESIP results will help meet the future vertical standards depends on texts that are not yet cited.
Claims the texts contradict
Section titled “Claims the texts contradict”| Common claim (including earlier versions of this page) | What the texts say |
|---|---|
| SESIP 1.0 was released on 26 May 2020 | GlobalPlatform dates v1.0 to March 2020, in its specification library and in the revision history of the document itself. The current version is 1.2, July 2023 |
| EN 17927 is an ETSI standard | It is a CEN-CENELEC standard, EN 17927:2023, owned by CEN/CLC/JTC 13 |
| SESIP2 is a functional test, SESIP3 is the black-box penetration test | SESIP2 is the black-box penetration testing level; SESIP3 is white-box, with source code analysis |
| SESIP4 is "the side-channel and fault injection level" | Physical attacks enter through functional requirements chosen in the Security Target. SESIP4 and SESIP5 were defined in v1.0 as complements to an existing Common Criteria certification at AVA_VAN.4 or 5 |
| SESIP1 needs no evaluator | An evaluator checks the Security Target for clarity and consistency; laboratories are licensed for SESIP1 under ISO/IEC 17025. What SESIP1 lacks is an independent check that the functional requirements are implemented |
| PSA Level 2 equals SESIP3, PSA Level 3 equals SESIP4 or 5 | The PSA Level 2 profile claims SESIP 2 and the PSA Level 3 profile claims SESIP 3 |
| There is a single, generic SESIP profile | Several SESIP Profiles exist, and an evaluation can be "ST based" with no profile |
| The SESIP SFR catalogue is a subset of ISO/IEC 15408-2 | The v1.0 text says SESIP does not use the Common Criteria Part 2 catalogue |
| Certificates last five years at levels 1 to 3 and two to three years at levels 4 and 5 | Governance v1.3: maximum five years for every certificate, which can be suspended or revoked at any time |
| EUCC "provides for SESIP incorporation" and SESIP will give CRA presumption of conformity | Regulation 2024/482 cites only the Common Criteria and the CEM. Under the CRA, only cited harmonised standards, common specifications or schemes under Regulation 2019/881 give presumption |
| SESIP replaces the EN 18031 assessment for RED 3.3 | EN 18031 is the cited standard; GlobalPlatform presents its mapping as supporting evidence only |
Practical points for a product team
Section titled “Practical points for a product team”- Read the certificate, not the logo. Check the level format ("SESIP2 with SESIP5 part(s)" style), the attacker profile, the profile or "ST based", the certification type and the expiry date.
- Check the composition guidance of each reused part. The integration must satisfy the objectives for the environment stated in the upstream Security Target, otherwise the composition does not hold.
- Choose the level by evidence available. Closed-source parts stop at SESIP2; SESIP3 needs source code mapped to the functional requirements.
- Plan for the five-year ceiling and for vulnerability handling during that period: the flaw reporting procedure (ALC_FLR.2) is evaluated at every level.
- Keep the regulatory file separate. A SESIP certificate supports, but does not replace, the EN 18031 assessment for the RED or the CRA conformity assessment.
See also
Section titled “See also”- Product cybersecurity: obligation, evaluation, label
- PSA Certified: Arm-led IoT security baseline
- TPM 2.0 and TCG hardware security
- Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408): IT security eval
- Cyber Resilience Act (CRA): EU baseline for digital
- IEC 62443 (ISA-99), industrial control cybersecurity
- ETSI EN 303 645: cybersecurity for consumer IoT
- EN 18031 published: the RED 3.3 path opens
- CRA: 17 draft ETSI standards open for comment
- spilma glossary
Sources & references
- GlobalPlatform, The Security Evaluation Standard for IoT Platforms (SESIP), programme page, GlobalPlatform globalplatform.org/sesip/
- GlobalPlatform, SESIP Methodology GP_FST_070: versions 1.0 (March 2020), 1.1 (July 2021) and 1.2 (July 2023), GlobalPlatform globalplatform.org/specs-library/sesip-methodology/
- GlobalPlatform, Security Evaluation Standard for IoT Platforms (SESIP) v1.0, Public Release, March 2020, GlobalPlatform globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/GP_SESIP_v1.0_PublicRelease.pdf
- GlobalPlatform, SESIP Bulletin No. 1, Transition period (v1.2 and EN 17927), January 2024, GlobalPlatform globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/SESIP-Bulletin-01-Transition-period.pdf
- GlobalPlatform, SESIP Governance v1.3 (GP_PRO_067), Public Release, September 2026, GlobalPlatform globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/GP_SESIP_Governance_v1.3_PublicRelease_signed.pdf
- GlobalPlatform, SESIP Profile for secure microcontrollers and microprocessors (MCU/MPU) v1.0.0.4, public review, GlobalPlatform globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/GPT_SESIP_Profile_Secure_MCU_MPU_v1.0.0.4_PublicRvw.pdf
- GlobalPlatform, SESIP to RED-hEN Mapping v1.0 (GPS_NOT_021), March 2024, GlobalPlatform globalplatform.org/specs-library/sesip-red-hen-mapping/
- SESIP Profile for PSA Certified Level 2 v1.0 (GPS_SPE_112), November 2025, GlobalPlatform / PSA Certified www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2025/12/GPS_SPE_112_PSACertified_Level_2_SESIP_Profile_v1.0.pdf
- SESIP Profile for PSA Certified Level 3, v1.0 REL 02, 24 November 2022, PSA Certified www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2022/11/JSADEN011-PSA_Certified_Level_3_PP_SESIP-V1.0-REL-02.pdf
- GlobalPlatform, What is PSA Certified? (scheme donated by Arm in September 2025), GlobalPlatform globalplatform.org/what-is-psa-certified/
- PSA Certified, Getting certified: the PSA Certified levels, PSA Certified www.psacertified.org/getting-certified/
- DIN EN 17927:2024-03, national adoption of EN 17927:2023 (SESIP), DIN Media www.dinmedia.de/en/standard/din-en-17927/373947944
- ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022, evaluation criteria for IT security, ISO www.iso.org/standard/72891.html
- Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Cyber Resilience Act, EUR-Lex eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj
- Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC), EUR-Lex eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/482/oj
- CEN, CENELEC and ETSI joint work programme for mandate M/606, version V1 of 2 April 2025, CEN-CENELEC www.cencenelec.eu/media/CEN-CENELEC/News/Newsletters/2025/m_606_work_programme_final.pdf
- European Commission, Cyber Resilience Act standardisation (M/606, C(2025)618), European Commission digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cra-standardisation
- Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/138, citation of EN 18031-1/-2/-3 under the RED, EUR-Lex eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/138/oj
Frequently asked questions
- What is SESIP and who publishes it?
- SESIP (Security Evaluation Standard for IoT Platforms) is a security evaluation methodology published by GlobalPlatform under reference GP_FST_070. Version 1.0 was released in March 2020, version 1.1 in July 2021 and version 1.2 in July 2023. It is based on Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408, version 3.1) but uses its own catalogue of security functional requirements and its own five assurance packages, SESIP1 to SESIP5, instead of the Common Criteria EAL packages. Version 1.2 was adopted by CEN and CENELEC as EN 17927.
- What does each SESIP level actually test?
- In the methodology text, SESIP1 is a self-assessment level: the evaluator only checks the Security Target for clarity and consistency (AVA_VAN.1). SESIP2 is a black-box penetration testing level against a basic attack potential (AVA_VAN.2). SESIP3 adds source code analysis, a white-box vulnerability analysis against an enhanced-basic attack potential (AVA_VAN.3). Version 1.0 reserves SESIP4 (AVA_VAN.4, moderate) and SESIP5 (AVA_VAN.5, high) for reuse of an existing Common Criteria certification.
- Is SESIP 4 the level for side-channel and fault injection?
- No. Physical attacks are brought into scope by security functional requirements chosen in the Security Target, "Limited Physical Attacker Resistance" or "Physical Attacker Resistance", not by the level number. The GlobalPlatform governance document already requires laboratories licensed for SESIP2 to master standard fault injection and standard side-channel analysis, and SESIP3 laboratories to master specialised techniques such as laser fault injection.
- How do PSA Certified levels map to SESIP?
- The SESIP Profile for PSA Certified Level 2 (GlobalPlatform GPS_SPE_112, v1.0, November 2025) claims SESIP 2. The SESIP Profile for PSA Certified Level 3 (v1.0 REL 02, November 2022) claims SESIP 3. The profiles size the vulnerability analysis of a standard PSA Root of Trust at 25 person-days for Level 2 and 35 person-days for Level 3. Arm donated the PSA Certified scheme to GlobalPlatform in September 2025.
- Does a SESIP certificate give presumption of conformity under the RED or the CRA?
- No. Under the CRA, presumption of conformity comes from harmonised standards cited in the Official Journal (Article 27(1)), common specifications, or European cybersecurity certification schemes adopted under Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (Article 27(8) and (9)). SESIP is a private GlobalPlatform scheme and EN 17927 is not cited under the RED or the CRA. A SESIP evaluation of the platform can still serve as evidence in the technical file, and GlobalPlatform published a mapping to the draft EN 18031 in March 2024.
- How long is a SESIP certificate valid?
- The SESIP Governance document (v1.3, September 2026) sets a maximum validity of five years for every SESIP certificate, whatever the level. The same text states that validity does not guarantee the product stays free of vulnerabilities, and that a certificate can be suspended or revoked at any time if a vulnerability or a non-compliance is found.
- Can a product combine parts evaluated at different SESIP levels?
- Yes. By default a composition can claim at most the lowest level of its parts. The Security Target may instead identify the security functions covered by a higher-level part, and the certificate then reads, for example, "SESIP2 with SESIP5 part(s)". The certificate also states whether the certification is standalone, a composition or dependent, and lists the reused certificates.