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IEC 62443 (ISA-99), industrial control cybersecurity

IEC 62443 is the international series on cybersecurity of industrial automation and control systems (IACS). It is written jointly by the ISA99 committee of the International Society of Automation and IEC technical committee 65, working group 10, and it addresses three audiences: asset owners, service providers and integrators, and product suppliers. This guide lists the parts and editions in force on 7 October 2026, the changes since 2023, the security level and foundational requirement model, the requirement lists of 62443-3-2 and 62443-4-1, the ISASecure and IECEE certification schemes, and what the CRA, NIS 2 and the Machinery Regulation actually say about the series.

The International Society of Automation established the ISA99 standards committee in 2002 (ISA). ISA99 and IEC TC 65 WG 10 develop the documents together, ISA submits them to the IEC, and the series is published twice: as ANSI/ISA-62443 in the United States and as IEC 62443 internationally. The years do not always match. ANSI/ISA-62443-4-2 is dated 2018, IEC 62443-4-2 is dated 2019; the ISA 2-4 is still the IEC 2015 edition with its 2017 amendment, while the IEC replaced it in December 2023.

ISA states that the IEC recognised the series as a horizontal standard in 2021, and the cover of IEC 62443-2-1:2024 carries the "horizontal publication" label. The general title also changed: early parts were published as "Industrial communication networks, network and system security" (3-3:2013, 1-1:2009), newer ones as "Security for industrial automation and control systems". The 2-1:2024 foreword says older titles will be updated at their next edition.

Parts and editions in force (7 October 2026)

Section titled “Parts and editions in force (7 October 2026)”
PartType, edition, dateTitle (abridged)Main user
1-1IEC TS, ed. 1.0, July 2009Terminology, concepts and modelsAll
1-5IEC TS, ed. 1.0, September 2023Scheme for IEC 62443 security profilesProfile authors, standards bodies
2-1IS, ed. 2.0, August 2024Security program requirements for IACS asset ownersAsset owner
2-2IEC PAS, ed. 1.0, March 2025IACS security protection schemeAsset owner, assessor
2-4IS, ed. 2.0, December 2023Security program requirements for IACS service providersIntegrator, maintenance provider
3-2IS, ed. 1.0, June 2020Security risk assessment for system designAsset owner, integrator
3-3IS, ed. 1.0, August 2013 (corrigendum April 2014)System security requirements and security levelsSystem supplier, integrator
4-1IS, ed. 1.0, January 2018Secure product development lifecycle requirementsProduct supplier
4-2IS, ed. 1.0, February 2019 (corrigendum 2022)Technical security requirements for IACS componentsProduct supplier
6-1IEC TS, ed. 1.0, March 2024Security evaluation methodology for IEC 62443-2-4Assessor
6-2IEC TS, ed. 1.0, January 2025Security evaluation methodology for IEC 62443-4-2Assessor

IS = International Standard, TS = Technical Specification, PAS = Publicly Available Specification. The IEC online catalogue gives 3-2, 3-3 and 2-4 a stability date of 2027. A revision in progress is not a publication: on 7 October 2026 there is no second edition of 3-2, 3-3, 4-1 or 4-2.

DateChangeSource
September 2023IEC TS 62443-1-5 publishes the method for defining security profiles (subsets of 62443 requirements for a domain or product type)IEC, CEN-CENELEC
15 December 2023IEC 62443-2-4 edition 2 cancels the 2015 edition and Amendment 1:2017; requirements that read as technical capabilities are reworded as use or configuration of capabilitiesIEC 62443-2-4:2023 foreword
March 2024IEC TS 62443-6-1, evaluation methodology for 2-4IEC
August 2024IEC 62443-2-1 edition 2 cancels the 2010 edition: requirements regrouped into eight security program elements, duplication of an ISMS removed, maturity model addedIEC 62443-2-1:2024 foreword
21 January 2025IEC TS 62443-6-2, evaluation methodology for 4-2; an IEC 62443-4-1 lifecycle is a prerequisiteIEC
March 2025IEC PAS 62443-2-2, IACS security protection schemeIEC, ISA
17 February 2026ISASecure ACSSA 1.0.0 takes effect (site-level evaluation of a deployed IACS)ISASecure
11 September 2026CRA reporting obligations applyRegulation (EU) 2024/2847
20 January 2027Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 applies, with Annex III points 1.1.9 and 1.2.1Regulation (EU) 2023/1230
11 December 2027CRA applies in fullRegulation (EU) 2024/2847

Security levels and foundational requirements

Section titled “Security levels and foundational requirements”

62443-3-3 and 62443-4-2 express technical requirements against seven foundational requirements (FR), each with a level from 1 to 4. The levels describe the attacker the system or component must resist.

LevelProtection against
SL 1Casual or coincidental violation
SL 2Intentional violation using simple means with low resources, generic skills and low motivation
SL 3Intentional violation using sophisticated means with moderate resources, IACS-specific skills and moderate motivation
SL 4Intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS-specific skills and high motivation

Three kinds of level coexist. SL-T (target) comes out of the 62443-3-2 risk assessment for a zone or conduit. SL-C (capability) is what a component or system can deliver when properly configured, as defined in 3-3 and 4-2. SL-A (achieved) is what the deployed design reaches. 62443-3-3 states that not every component must support every requirement at the target level: compensating countermeasures may provide the function at system level, provided they are documented so that the SL-A reflects them. Because a level is given per FR, a level is in practice a vector of seven values (3-3, Annex A).

FRName (IEC 62443-3-3)
FR 1Identification and authentication control
FR 2Use control
FR 3System integrity
FR 4Data confidentiality
FR 5Restricted data flow
FR 6Timely response to events
FR 7Resource availability

In 3-3, each system requirement (SR) carries requirement enhancements (RE) that are added as the level rises; 4-2 does the same with component requirements (CR). 3-3 assumes the asset owner runs a security program to 62443-2-1 and that patch management follows IEC TR 62443-2-3.

62443-3-2 is organised as seven zone and conduit requirements (ZCR). It is the design-stage deliverable from which SL-T values are derived.

ZCRRequirementSub-requirements
ZCR 1Identify the system under consideration (SuC)1.1 perimeter and access points
ZCR 2Initial cyber security risk assessment2.1
ZCR 3Partition the SuC into zones and conduits3.1 establish zones and conduits; 3.2 separate business and IACS assets; 3.3 separate safety related assets; 3.4 separate temporarily connected devices; 3.5 separate wireless devices; 3.6 separate devices connected via external networks
ZCR 4Risk comparison4.1 compare initial risk to tolerable risk
ZCR 5Detailed cyber security risk assessment5.1 threats to 5.13 documentation, with 5.6 determine SL-T and 5.10 determine residual risk
ZCR 6Document cyber security requirements, assumptions and constraints6.1 requirements specification; 6.2 SuC description, and further items
ZCR 7Asset owner approval7.1 attain asset owner approval

The standard does not prescribe the Purdue level model. What it does require are the five separations of ZCR 3.2 to 3.6, and an asset owner sign-off at the end.

62443-4-1, the eight practices and their 47 requirements

Section titled “62443-4-1, the eight practices and their 47 requirements”
PracticeRequirementsContent (requirement titles)
1, Security management (SM)SM-1 to SM-13Development process, responsibilities, applicability, expertise, process scoping, file integrity, development environment security, private keys, externally provided components, third-party custom components, assessing security issues, process verification, continuous improvement
2, Specification of security requirements (SR)SR-1 to SR-5Product security context, threat model, product security requirements and their content, requirements review
3, Secure by design (SD)SD-1 to SD-4Secure design principles, defense in depth design, design review, design best practices
4, Secure implementation (SI)SI-1, SI-2Implementation review, secure coding standards
5, Security verification and validation testing (SVV)SVV-1 to SVV-5Requirements testing, threat mitigation testing, vulnerability testing, penetration testing, independence of testers
6, Management of security-related issues (DM)DM-1 to DM-6Receiving, reviewing, assessing, addressing and disclosing issues, periodic review of the practice
7, Security update management (SUM)SUM-1 to SUM-5Update qualification, update documentation, dependent component or OS update documentation, delivery, timely delivery of patches
8, Security guidelines (SG)SG-1 to SG-7Product defense in depth, measures expected in the environment, hardening, secure disposal, secure operation, account management, documentation review

Clause 4.2 of 4-1 defines a maturity model (Table 1) used to rate how the process is applied. Practice 6 is "management of security-related issues", not "defect management", even though its requirements carry the DM prefix.

4-2 differentiates requirements for four component types: software applications, embedded devices, host devices and network devices. ISASecure quotes the 4-2 definitions of the three device types:

TypeDefinition (IEC 62443-4-2)
Embedded deviceSpecial purpose device running embedded software designed to directly monitor, control or actuate an industrial process
Host deviceGeneral purpose device running an operating system capable of hosting one or more software applications, data stores or functions from one or more suppliers
Network deviceDevice that facilitates data flow between devices, or restricts the flow of data, but may not directly interact with a control process

A product claiming SL-C 2 on FR 1 must meet the FR 1 component requirements and the requirement enhancements assigned to level 2 for its component type.

62443-2-1:2024, the eight security program elements

Section titled “62443-2-1:2024, the eight security program elements”
SPETopic
SPE 1Organizational security measures (including ORG 1.1, information security management system)
SPE 2Configuration management
SPE 3Network and communications security
SPE 4Component security
SPE 5Protection of data
SPE 6User access control
SPE 7Event and incident management
SPE 8System integrity and availability

ISASecure (ISA Security Compliance Institute)

Section titled “ISASecure (ISA Security Compliance Institute)”
SchemeStandard(s)Current versionAnnual registration fee
SDLA, Security Development Lifecycle Assurance62443-4-1 (development process)3.0.0, effective 16 June 2020USD 1,500
CSA, Component Security Assurance62443-4-2 and 62443-4-1; SL-C 1 to 41.0.0, effective 28 August 2019USD 1,200
ICSA, IIoT Component Security Assurance62443-4-2 and 4-1; Core tier (SL 2 based), Advanced tier (SL 4 based)1.0.0USD 1,200
SSA, System Security Assurance62443-3-3 and the process requirements of 62443-4-14.0.0, effective 28 August 2019USD 1,200
ACSSA, Automation and Control System Security Assurance62443-2-1, 2-4, 3-2 and 3-3 (deployed IACS)1.0.0, effective 17 February 2026CB registration USD 3,000 (3-year certificate)

Fees are the ISCI registration fees listed on isasecure.org; they do not include the certification body assessment. Every product certification (CSA, ICSA, SSA) requires an SDLA certification of the supplier process, which can be obtained in parallel. CSA 1.0.0 replaced the earlier EDSA program for embedded devices. ISASecure certification bodies are accredited to ISO/IEC 17065; ACSSA also offers an inspection route through ISO/IEC 17020 inspection bodies, which ends in a letter instead of a certificate.

The IECEE runs cyber security as one of the categories of its standards list (CYBR, see CB Scheme). IECEE test report forms are published on the IEC online catalogue, for example TRF 62443-4-2B:2023 for IEC 62443-4-2:2019, with others for 2-4, 3-3 and 4-1. The two IEC evaluation methodologies, TS 62443-6-1 (for 2-4) and TS 62443-6-2 (for 4-2), describe how evaluators reach repeatable results; 6-2 states that it does not define a certification scheme.

Test labs and certification bodies also issue their own 62443 certificates outside ISASecure and IECEE, sometimes alongside CE work under the RED delegated act (EN 18031, applicable since 1 August 2025) or CRA preparation. Before relying on one, check which part and which edition it covers, whether the body is accredited for that scope, and whether the certificate concerns a process (4-1), a product capability (4-2, 3-3) or a deployed system (2-1, 3-2).

The Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) applies reporting obligations from 11 September 2026 and in full from 11 December 2027. It covers products with digital elements placed on the EU market. Presumption of conformity comes from harmonised standards cited in the OJ, common specifications or EU cybersecurity certification schemes. The Commission request M/606 (C(2025) 618) covers 41 standards (Commission). In the CEN-CENELEC webinar of 9 September 2025, CENELEC TC 65X WG 3 (the European mirror of IEC TC 65 WG 10) set out this plan:

DeliverableBasisPurposePlanned publication (September 2025 plan)
EN IEC 62443-4-1:2018/A114-1CRA Annex I Part I(1) and Part II (process, vulnerability handling)December 2026
EN IEC 62443-4-2:2019/A114-2 with the 6-2 evaluation approachCRA Annex I Part I(2) (product requirements)December 2026
Six product standards (prEN 50XXX-1 to -6), built as 1-5 profiles4-1, 4-2VPN products, network management systems, SIEM systems, network interfaces, routers, modems and switches (class I); firewalls and intrusion detection or prevention systems including industrial ones (class II)November 2026

These are plans, not publications. On 7 October 2026 no 62443-based standard is cited under the CRA. For the CRA itself, see Cyber Resilience Act.

Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 applies from 20 January 2027 and repeals Directive 2006/42/EC from that date. Two essential requirements of Annex III deal with cyber threats:

PointWhat the text requires
1.1.9, Protection against corruptionConnecting another device, directly or remotely, must not lead to a hazardous situation; hardware relevant to accessing safety-critical software is protected against accidental or intentional corruption; critical software and data are identified and protected; the machine identifies its safety software at all times; evidence of legitimate or illegitimate intervention or modification is collected
1.2.1, Safety and reliability of control systemsControl systems withstand intended and unintended external influences, "including reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts from third parties leading to a hazardous situation"; a tracing log of interventions and safety software versions uploaded after placing on the market is enabled for five years

Article 20(9) presumes conformity with these two points for machinery certified, or covered by a statement of conformity, under a cybersecurity certification scheme adopted under Regulation (EU) 2019/881 and referenced in the OJ. An IEC 62443 certificate is not such a scheme. No harmonised standard is cited yet under Regulation 2023/1230. CENELEC TC 65X WG 3 lists a liaison with CLC/TC 44X WG 2, "protection against corruption". See Machinery Directive and Regulation.

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 entered into force on 16 January 2023; Member States had to transpose it by 17 October 2024 and apply it from 18 October 2024 (Article 41). Energy and drinking water are in Annex I, chemicals and manufacturing in Annex II. Article 21(1) requires measures that take into account "the state-of-the-art and, where applicable, relevant European and international standards"; Article 25 asks Member States to encourage such standards without favouring a particular technology. The Directive does not name IEC 62443; its recitals cite the ISO/IEC 27000 series for physical and environmental security and ISO/IEC 30111 and 29147 for vulnerability handling.

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 (September 2023) maps each step of the NIST Risk Management Framework, as applied to OT, to the Cybersecurity Framework and to IEC 62443 requirements, for example IEC 62443-2-1 ORG 1.3 for risk management roles. The NERC CIP standards are mandatory reliability standards for the North American bulk electric system; a 62443 certificate does not replace CIP compliance evidence.

PointISO/IEC 27001IEC 62443
ObjectAn organisation and its information security management systemAn IACS, its asset owner, its service providers and its components
Product requirementsNone3-3 (system) and 4-2 (component), with security levels
Development processNot specified for products4-1 secure development lifecycle
Link between them2-1:2024 includes an ISMS requirement (ORG 1.1) and was revised to remove duplication of an ISMS
Stated design driver3-3 introduction: adapt business IT requirements and combine them with the "strong availability" IACS need

An ISO/IEC 27001 certificate does not show conformity with any 62443 part, and a 62443-4-2 product certificate says nothing about the corporate IT perimeter.

  1. Classify the product as software application, embedded device, host device or network device (4-2), and write the product security context and threat model (4-1 SR-1, SR-2).
  2. Set the target SL-C per FR from the integrator or asset owner SL-T, or from the intended use.
  3. Put the 4-1 lifecycle in place: the eight practices and their 47 requirements, with records that show the process is applied.
  4. Implement and test: secure design principles and defense in depth (SD-1, SD-2), for example secure boot and a hardware root of trust where the threat model calls for one, secure coding standards (SI-2), threat mitigation, vulnerability and penetration testing (SVV-2 to SVV-4), with tester independence (SVV-5).
  5. Organise issue handling and updates: receiving and disclosing issues (DM-1 to DM-5), update qualification and timely delivery (SUM-1 to SUM-5).
  6. Write the security guidelines (SG-1 to SG-7): defense in depth, hardening, secure operation, accounts, disposal.
  7. Choose the evaluation route: ISASecure SDLA then CSA or ICSA, an IECEE CB test report, or another accredited body.
  8. Map to EU law: CRA (vulnerability reporting from 11 September 2026), Machinery Regulation points 1.1.9 and 1.2.1 when the product is a safety-relevant part of a machine.

For planning, see certification timeline.

Common claimWhat the texts say
"IEC 62443-2-4 is the 2015 edition with Amendment 1:2017."Edition 2.0 of 15 December 2023 cancels and replaces both (IEC 62443-2-4:2023 foreword). Only the ANSI/ISA version still carries the 2015+2017 content.
"62443-1-1 revision expected in 2025."On 7 October 2026 the IEC online catalogue still lists IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009. No date for a replacement is given.
"Practice 6 of 4-1 is Defect Management."Its title is "Management of security-related issues"; DM is only the requirement prefix.
"ISASecure SSA covers 62443-3-3 with the 3-2 risk assessment."SSA covers all 3-3 control system requirements and the process requirements of 4-1. The 3-2 risk assessment belongs to ACSSA, which evaluates a deployed IACS against 2-1, 2-4, 3-2 and 3-3.
"ACSSA ties into 62443-2-1 only."ACSSA 1.0.0 (effective 17 February 2026) evaluates against 2-1, 2-4, 3-2 and 3-3.
"SL 4 means a state-sponsored attacker."The standards describe SL 4 by means, resources, skills and motivation (sophisticated, extended, IACS-specific, high); they do not name state actors.
"NIS 2 has been in force since October 2024."It entered into force on 16 January 2023; 18 October 2024 is the date from which Member States apply their transposition measures (Article 41).
"NIS 2 and the CRA treat 62443 as the first-line reference."Neither text names IEC 62443. NIS 2 refers to European and international standards in general; the CRA gives presumption only to standards cited under it, and none based on 62443 is cited yet.
"A 62443 certificate covers the Machinery Regulation cyber points."Article 20(9) gives presumption only to schemes adopted under Regulation (EU) 2019/881. A 62443 assessment can still serve as technical evidence for 1.1.9 and 1.2.1.
"ISO 27001 ranks confidentiality first, 62443 ranks safety, availability, integrity, confidentiality."Neither standard sets such a ranking. 3-3 speaks of the strong availability IACS need; 2-1:2024 integrates an ISMS rather than opposing it.
"62443 requires the Purdue model."3-2 requires zones, conduits and five specific separations (ZCR 3.2 to 3.6); it does not prescribe a level model.

Sources & references

  1. IEC 62443-2-1:2024 (edition 2.0, August 2024), preview, IEC webstore.iec.ch/en/iec_catalog/product/preview/?id=L3B1Yi9wZGYvcHJldmlldy9pbmZvX2llYzYyNDQzLTItMXtlZDIuMH1iLnBkZg%3D%3D
  2. IEC 62443-2-4:2023 (edition 2.0, December 2023), IEC webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/67631
  3. IEC 62443-3-2:2020, security risk assessment for system design, IEC webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/30727
  4. IEC 62443-3-3:2013, system security requirements and security levels, IEC webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/7033
  5. IEC 62443-4-1:2018, secure product development lifecycle requirements, IEC webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/33615
  6. IEC 62443-4-2:2019, technical security requirements for IACS components, IEC webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/34421
  7. IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, terminology, concepts and models, IEC webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/7029
  8. IEC TS 62443-6-1:2024, evaluation methodology for IEC 62443-2-4, IEC webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/67462
  9. IEC TS 62443-6-2:2025, evaluation methodology for IEC 62443-4-2, IEC webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/67463
  10. IECEE Test Report Form 62443-4-2B:2023, IEC (IECEE) webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/90117
  11. ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards (ISA99 committee), International Society of Automation www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-standards/isa-iec-62443-series-of-standards
  12. ISASecure certification schemes, ISA Security Compliance Institute isasecure.org/certification
  13. ISASecure Component Security Assurance (CSA), ISA Security Compliance Institute isasecure.org/certification/iec-62443-csa-certification
  14. ISASecure Automation and Control System Security Assurance (ACSSA) 1.0.0, ISA Security Compliance Institute isasecure.org/acssa-certification
  15. CRA Standards Unlocked: from EN IEC 62443 to CRA (webinar, 9 September 2025), CEN-CENELEC www.cencenelec.eu/media/CEN-CENELEC/Events/Webinars/2025/2025-09-08_webinar_unlocking_cra_iec62443-series-for-cra.pdf
  16. Cyber Resilience Act, standardisation (request M/606), European Commission digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cra-standardisation
  17. Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847), EUR-Lex eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj
  18. NIS 2 Directive (Directive (EU) 2022/2555), EUR-Lex eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj
  19. Machinery Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2023/1230), EUR-Lex eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1230/oj
  20. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security, NIST csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final
  21. NERC CIP standards (Critical Infrastructure Protection), North American Electric Reliability Corporation www.nerc.com/standards/reliability-standards/cip

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between ISA-99 and IEC 62443?
ISA99 is the standards committee that the International Society of Automation set up in 2002. It develops the series together with IEC technical committee 65, working group 10, and ISA submits its documents to the IEC for adoption. The result is published twice, as ANSI/ISA-62443 and as IEC 62443, sometimes with different years (ANSI/ISA-62443-4-2 is dated 2018, IEC 62443-4-2 is dated 2019). "ISA-99" survives as the name of the committee.
Which IEC 62443 editions are current in October 2026?
IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, IEC 62443-2-1:2024 (edition 2), IEC 62443-2-4:2023 (edition 2, which replaced the 2015 edition and its 2017 amendment), IEC 62443-3-2:2020, IEC 62443-3-3:2013, IEC 62443-4-1:2018 and IEC 62443-4-2:2019 with its 2022 corrigendum. Newer documents are IEC TS 62443-1-5:2023, IEC TS 62443-6-1:2024, IEC PAS 62443-2-2:2025 and IEC TS 62443-6-2:2025. Parts 3-2, 3-3, 4-1 and 4-2 have no second edition yet.
What do the security levels mean?
SL 1 protects against casual or coincidental violation. SL 2 against intentional violation using simple means with low resources, generic skills and low motivation. SL 3 against sophisticated means with moderate resources, IACS-specific skills and moderate motivation. SL 4 against sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS-specific skills and high motivation. Levels are set per foundational requirement and come in three kinds: target (SL-T), capability (SL-C) and achieved (SL-A).
What does 62443-3-2 require?
Seven zone and conduit requirements, ZCR 1 to ZCR 7: identify the system under consideration, run an initial risk assessment, partition it into zones and conduits, compare initial risk with tolerable risk, run a detailed risk assessment that ends with a target security level per zone or conduit, document the security requirements, and obtain asset owner approval. The partitioning step explicitly separates business from IACS assets, safety-related assets, temporarily connected devices, wireless devices and devices connected through external networks.
What does 62443-4-1 require from a product supplier?
A secure development lifecycle made of eight practices and 47 requirements: security management (SM-1 to SM-13), specification of security requirements (SR-1 to SR-5), secure by design (SD-1 to SD-4), secure implementation (SI-1, SI-2), security verification and validation testing (SVV-1 to SVV-5), management of security-related issues (DM-1 to DM-6), security update management (SUM-1 to SUM-5) and security guidelines (SG-1 to SG-7). The standard also defines a maturity model used to rate how the process is applied.
Which ISASecure certifications exist?
SDLA certifies a development process to 62443-4-1. CSA certifies a component to 62443-4-2 at capability security level 1 to 4 and requires SDLA. ICSA certifies IIoT devices and gateways in two tiers, Core (based on SL 2) and Advanced (based on SL 4). SSA certifies a control system to 62443-3-3 plus the process requirements of 62443-4-1. ACSSA, effective 17 February 2026, evaluates a deployed IACS and its asset owner against 62443-2-1, 2-4, 3-2 and 3-3.
Does the CRA or NIS 2 make IEC 62443 mandatory?
No. NIS 2 Article 21(1) asks for measures that take into account the state of the art and, where applicable, European and international standards, without naming any. The CRA gives a presumption of conformity only through harmonised standards cited in the Official Journal. Under request M/606, CENELEC TC 65X WG 3 is adapting EN IEC 62443-4-1 and EN IEC 62443-4-2 and drafting six product standards on that basis; none was cited on 7 October 2026.
Does the Machinery Regulation refer to IEC 62443?
Not by name. Regulation (EU) 2023/1230, which applies from 20 January 2027, adds Annex III point 1.1.9 on protection against corruption and requires in point 1.2.1 that control systems withstand reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts leading to a hazardous situation. Article 20(9) gives a presumption of conformity for those two points to certificates under an EU cybersecurity certification scheme, not to an IEC 62443 certificate.